应用侧漏洞与CTF题解:https://wnagzihxa1n.gitbook.io

CVE-2019-9729 冒险岛Online键盘保护驱动本地提权漏洞

前几天看到的一个漏洞,想来有趣,就翻译了一下,顺带跟着作者分析了一下这个漏洞

1. What is SdoKeyCrypt.sys?(什么是SdoKeyCrypt.sys)

SdoKeyCrypt.sys is a keyboard protection driver for a MMORPG, aka Massively-Multiplayer-Online-Role-Playing-Game, called MapleStory Online which is published by Shanda Group in China.

SdoKeyCrypt.sys是盛大冒险岛的一个键盘保护驱动

The game’s official website: http://mxd.sdo.com. (Language: Chinese)

官方站点:http://mxd.sdo.com

This driver will be downloaded and installed in C:\Windows\System32\ folder when the game runs first time. Because the game is very big, approximately 13.11 GB, here I made a backup SdoKeyCrypt.sys for anyone who wants to reproduce this exploit.

当冒险岛第一次运行的时候,这个驱动会安装在C:\Windows\System32\,因为游戏非常大,差不多13.11GB,所以我搞了一个备份文件方便大家复现这个漏洞

SdoKeyCrypt.sys is surely OFFICIAL and is NOT modified by anyone.

驱动SdoKeyCrypt.sys肯定是官方的而且没有被任何人修改过

You can see there’s a valid digest signature signed by Shanda Computer (Shanghai) Co., Ltd. which confirms SdoKeyCrypt.sys is indeed made by Shanda.

如图所示,它有盛大官方的数字签名,确定这个是盛大写的

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2. What is the vulnerability caused by?(漏洞成因)

In IRP_MJ_DEVICE_CONTROL handle routine, when IOCTL code is (DWORD)(-0x7FFF3FFC + 0x18) = 0x8000c01c, the driver does not properly handle data passed from user space, which causes a size value can be negative so that a heap underflow will occur.

在该驱动的IRP_MJ_DEVICE_CONTROL里,当IOCTL Code为(DWORD)(-0x7FFF3FFC + 0x18) = 0x8000c01c的时候,没有正确处理好从用户空间传入的数据,导致可以指定这个值为一个负数,从而导致堆下溢

With the help of heap spraying, aka pool-Feng-Shui attack, one can disable SMEP and run any shellcode in kernel mode to make local privilege elevation.

攻击者可以使用堆风水绕过SMEP并且在内核执行shellcode,造成本地提权

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3. How to use PoC code?

With x64 Microsoft Visual C++ compiler (which supports c++11)

$ cl poc.cpp /Fe:poc.exe /link /dynamicbase:no /fixed ntdll.lib

Tested on Visual Studio 2017 Community, the following is an example of output:

C:\Github\SdoKeyCrypt-sys-local-privilege-elevation>cl poc.cpp /Fe:poc.exe /link /dynamicbase:no /fixed ntdll.lib
Microsoft (R) C/C++ Optimizing Compiler Version 19.16.27027.1 for x64
Copyright (C) Microsoft Corporation.  All rights reserved.

poc.cpp
Microsoft (R) Incremental Linker Version 14.16.27027.1
Copyright (C) Microsoft Corporation.  All rights reserved.

/out:poc.exe
/dynamicbase:no
/fixed
ntdll.lib
poc.obj

Then make sure that SdoKeyCrypt.sys is loaded and run poc.exe directly. If nothing wrong, you should get a nt authority\system shell.

4. Screenshot

The PoC code has been tested and works fine on Win10 1709 and Win10 1803.

However it does not work on Win10 1809 which uses heap-backed pool that mitigates heap-spray attack. But it can cause BSOD, so there’s local Denial-of-Service vulnerability at least.

The following is a test video on Win10 1803 17134.619.

D9888CC4736FD461ECC616A080FC6CB0.gif

我尝试着在本地跟了一下,如下图所示,这里是DriverEntry,红色箭头所指的位置是IrpDeviceIoControl

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跟入看到几个关键的变量

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在case为0x18的地方,会调用函数sub_139E0,该函数第三个参数取传入的字符串偏移8字节位置的数据

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这里的cbSize就是传入的第三个参数,这里分配内存,可以明显看到这里没有进行判断就直接使用了,如果我们传入的为-1cbSize+this->Length会大于0,通过此处的判断,下面for循环会直接跳过,在while循环里,Source[i++ + cbSize]会变成Source[-1],导致下溢

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最近逆OLLVM后的APP,逆的头秃,看了下驱动这种不混淆的,突然感觉好开心!